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TEACHING POLICY INSTRUMENT CHOICE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
THE FIVE P’S
JAMES SALZMAN†
Difficult choices lie at the heart of environmental law and policy.
Should we reduce emissions of greenhouse gases? Should we protect
a local population of endangered plants? Should we limit the catch in
a fishery that seems in danger of collapsing? And if we take these
actions, how much should we reduce the activity? Answering these
questions is fascinating but no easy matter. It requires consideration
of scientific, economic, legal, and political issues, not to mention the
trade-offs that inevitably arise.
And even if we can agree that emissions of a particular pollutant
are too high, that grazing levels of the local commons must be
reduced, or that a local endangered species requires greater
protection, a fundamental choice still remains: We need to decide
how best to achieve these goals.
Put another way, even if we agree on our starting point and end
point, we still need to determine which path should take us there.
Reliance on regulatory mandates? Market instruments? Pilot projects
or information generation? Implementing environmental policy is
where the rubber meets the road, and it has provided some of the most
innovative policy instruments in all of American law.
While environmental law may appear dauntingly complex, and
on occasion truly is, it turns out that understanding instrument choice
can be straightforward. Perhaps surprisingly, there are only five basic
policy instruments in play, and these can be effectively taught through
a simple framework known as “The Five P’s.”
Just as a complex sonata can be reduced to a small number of
white and black piano keys, so can students’ mastery of the Five P’s
allow them to identify the potential range of policy instruments at

† Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law and Nicholas Institute Professor of Environmental
Policy, Duke University. I am grateful to the many environmental law students over the years
who have discussed and helped develop the Five P’s in class.

363

Salzman (Do Not Delete)

5/7/2013 11:17 AM

364

[Vol. XXIII:363

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

work in any statute. Despite their application across a dizzying range
of situations, the basic environmental policy tools remain the same.
The “Five P’s” include Prescriptive Regulation, Property Rights,
Penalties, Payments, and Persuasion. There will rarely be one best
tool for a particular situation, and much of the challenge in
instrument choice lies in identifying each instrument’s particular
advantages and disadvantages.
The DELPF editors have kindly invited me to set out the Five
P’s as a teaching tool for other instructors to consider. Easy to
remember, over the years it has proven a user-friendly and effective
approach in the classroom. In the sections below, I use the well1
known Tragedy of the Commons as a shared example.
1. PRESCRIPTIVE REGULATION

2

Prescriptive regulations mandate what parties can and cannot
do—Thou Shalt or Thou Shalt Not. This is both the most direct and
the most common form of environmental law. In the context of
overgrazing the commons, for example, the government might limit
the number of sheep that may graze, or restrict grazing to a particular
season or period of time.
We see prescriptive regulations at all levels of environmental
3
governance—from hunting permits at the local level and effluent
4
limits under the Clean Water Act at the national level to restrictions

1. As legions of law students have learned, Garrett Hardin’s classic example of the
tragedy of the commons is one of grazing sheep. In it, too many sheep are grazing on an openaccess commons, and unless something is done, the grass will soon be overgrazed and no sheep
will be able to feed on the commons. Individual incentives encourage rapid depletion of the
resource to the detriment of all—hence the tragedy. Government intervention becomes
necessary because the problems of hold-outs (parties that are not willing to cooperate), free
riders (parties that will do nothing but benefit from others’ contributions), and collective action
(the transaction costs from bringing multiple parties together to seek agreement) make it
infeasible for individual shepherds to come together and agree on a solution. See Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
2. The following sections are adapted from JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON THOMPSON,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 47–53 (3d ed. 2010).
3. See, e.g., 4 SANFORD, N.C. CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 4-15 (2010) (requiring
hunters seeking to conduct “urban archery deer hunting” to “have in their possession a valid
North Carolina Hunting License showing completion of a hunting safety course” and to “hunt
from an elevated platform of at least ten feet above ground.”)
4. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a)(1) (2011) (“The permittee shall comply with effluent
standards or prohibitions established under section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act . . . .”).
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on foreign commerce in endangered species under the Convention on
5
International Trade in Endangered Species.
Also referred to as command-and-control regulation, prescriptive
regulation can be very effective in mandating uniform compliance
across all actors, preventing problems of hold-outs, free riders, and
collective action. If implemented across a broad geographic area, it
can also prevent a “race to the bottom,” in which regulated parties
6
seek jurisdictions with less stringent requirements.
There is considerable debate, however, over the efficiency of
7
prescriptive regulations. Economists, for example, often criticize
them as inefficient and unwieldy. They argue that this approach
provides little incentive for innovation because once the regulated
party has satisfied the necessary requirement, the law creates no
incentive to reduce harmful activities further. Once a company has
reduced its emissions to the mandated limit of, for example, ten tons
per year, there is no obvious benefit in further reducing emissions.
Such regulations also tend to encourage reliance on traditional,
proven control technologies rather than on pollution-prevention
8
strategies and new technologies. “So long as the regulations require
use of Filter X, we’ve bought Filter X, and it’s working properly,” a
plant manager might reason, “there’s no need to go further.”
It is important to note arguments that, by forcing better
environmental performance, prescriptive regulations can actually
increase efficiencies and productivity, often resulting in benefits to
the company. Noted economist Michael Porter, for example, has
argued that strict environmental regulation encourages production-

5. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
art. II, § 4, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
6. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a
“Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (defending the validity of the
“race to the bottom” theory). But cf. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1210 (1992) (questioning the vitality of the race-to-the-bottom argument).
7. Compare Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (1985) (“The present regulatory system wastes tens of billions of
dollars every year, misdirects resources, stifles innovation, and spawns massive and often
counterproductive litigation.”), with Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1267, 1331 (1985) (“In light of the inefficiencies associated with command-and-control
standards, one could not conclude that uniform treatments are invariably superior to
individualized decisionmaking, but that the opposite generalization is equally untenable.”).
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 420–21
(1990).
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9

process and design innovations. These cost savings, Porter contends,
can exceed both compliance and innovation costs, resulting in greater
10
competitiveness.
Two unstated assumptions behind prescriptive regulation merit
mention. The first is that the regulator will set the standard at the
proper level. This may not happen, either because of inadequate
information or agency capture (a classic problem in the context of
natural resources such as fish and timber, where industry pressure has
11
led to overfishing and large-scale clearcutting). The second
assumption is that the regulator will be able to monitor compliance
with the standard. Both impose administrative costs, which, as a
result, can sometimes be a good deal higher for prescriptive
regulation than for other policy instruments.
2. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A classic solution to the tragedy of the commons is to privatize
the resource by creating property rights. Using our grazing example,
instead of an open-access commons, assume the field has now been
divided into square parcels of land and allocated to individual
shepherds, including you. You now have the right to exclude
everyone else’s sheep from your parcel. Are you still as eager to
overgraze as before?
All of a sudden, your previous incentive to consume the resource
as fast as possible (before everyone else does) is no longer relevant.
Instead, your interests are best served by carefully tending your part
of the commons so it remains productive long into the future—so it is
sustainably managed. You may well charge other shepherds to use
your parcel, or even let them on for free, but you would do so only to
the extent that the resource base remains intact and productive—that
is, so long as the resource is not overgrazed. In financial terms, to
maximize profits you will safeguard your asset over the longer term.
The same should be true whether the property rights are vested in

9. See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97 (1995) (presenting
examples of instances where “environmental innovation produces net benefits for private
companies”).
10. Id. at 100 (“Thus the net cost of compliance can fall with stringency and may even turn
into a net benefit.”).
11. JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 219–20 (2d ed.
2009).
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individuals or in communities (as is the case in many indigenous
cultures).
The Law of the Sea provides a classic example of a property
rights approach at the international level. In part to strengthen the
sustainable management of fisheries, coastal states were given control
over resources in the seas up to 200 nautical miles off their coasts, in a
12
new jurisdiction known as the Exclusive Economic Zone. The global
commons of the high seas was carved up, with countries given
exclusive authority over the most productive areas off their coastlines.
Compared to prescriptive regulation, this approach should have
lower administrative costs. The government simply creates the
property rights, allocates them initially, and steps back, leaving future
allocations to the market. A number of commentators have called for
far greater reliance on property-rights approaches to environmental
protection. Sometimes called “Free Market Environmentalism,” this
strategy would privatize as many environmental resources as possible,
based on the belief that markets provide better resource-allocation
13
mechanisms than government regulators.
Implicit in a property-rights approach is the importance of
technology. To enforce your right to exclude, you need both to know
someone is making use of your resource (an issue of monitoring
capacity) and to have the ability to exclude others’ use. As an
example, consider the history of the American West and its iconic
cattle drive, where thousands of cattle were driven across the
landscape to the railroad terminus where they could be shipped to
market. A staple of Western films, this practice endured for only a
few decades. The invention of barbed wire enabled settlers for the
first time to exclude cattle effectively and affordably from trespassing
14
across their lands. In a more modern context, decoders have allowed
satellite television channels to privatize the airwave commons. Unless
satellite-channel providers could exclude others’ use by scrambling
their signals, there would be no way for them to sell their product,
since people could use it for free.
12. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
13. See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (rev. ed. 2001) (advocating for the use of markets and property rights to
implement environmental policies).
14. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morris, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice
Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 131–32
(2001) (relaying the history of barbed wire as an important technology in enforcing property
rights).

Salzman (Do Not Delete)

5/7/2013 11:17 AM

368

[Vol. XXIII:363

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

Despite the increasing interest and application of property-rights
approaches to environmental protection, they face some significant
obstacles. The first is that many environmental resources are not
easily amenable to commodification. When resources have significant
public-goods aspects (such as major watersheds or biodiversity),
privatization might not lead to the most socially beneficial use of the
land. Private-property owners typically value only those uses that
provide monetary remuneration. In these cases, the important
positive externalities will not be valued. Perhaps the new owners of
the commons wish to use it for mini-golf while the sheep starve and
people go hungry. If the government wants to ensure the important
public goals of a secure food supply, conservation of rare biodiversity,
or buffers against flooding, it may need to step in and restrict the use
of the land. Property-rights advocates would generally approve of this
sort of government restriction, it should be noted, so long as the
government pays the property holders for the corresponding loss in
value.
There may also be normative concerns that rub against
privatization of national parks or other environmental amenities in
the public domain. For example, the government could try to
“privatize” wildlife by equipping each animal with a collar or tag that
identifies its “owner.” As a result, though, collared wildlife would lose
part of its “wildness,” the quality that gives it a unique and valuable
15
identity.
Practically, there also are difficult allocation issues for the initial
privatization of environmental resources. Using the commons as an
example, assume that the government has divided up the land into
fifty separate parcels. Whom should be given title? Should the land be
auctioned to the highest bidder? This could favor wealthier
newcomers and corporate interests. To give more respect to
traditional users, perhaps the allocation could be based on historic
use or current levels of consumption? Yet this would put newcomers
at a disadvantage and favor those who have been the most profligate
in the past. If we cannot decide among these competing users, should
we just have a random drawing? Any allocation mechanism will tend
to favor some groups at the expense of others. Inevitably, who should

15. See Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1999) (“Wildness, understood as unpredictability or freedom from
human control, imparts an aura that cannot be duplicated by captive species. That aura attracts
and inspires us. It makes us care about wild places and wild creatures, and leads us to believe
they merit special protection.”).
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be favored comes down to a contentious political decision, with
winners and losers.
A. Tradable Permits
Prescriptive regulations can be combined with property rights
through the use of tradable permits in environmental markets. Here,
property rights are created for use of the resource—for the right to
graze sheep in a certain area, emit a ton of sulfur dioxide, or catch a
lobster, for example. Trading systems use the market to make
prescriptive regulation more efficient. The government decides how
much of a harmful activity to permit (just as it would with
prescriptive regulations), awards private rights to engage in the
activity up to the regulatory cap, and then permits those rights to be
traded. The market does not play a role in determining the overall
level of environmental protection; that is the role of the regulatory
regime.
To make this more concrete, imagine how a trading program
would work with grazing on the commons. Policy-makers decide that
the commons can sustain no more than 400 sheep grazing per year.
The government therefore creates 400 permits, entitling the holder to
graze one sheep for the calendar year listed on the permit. Unless the
shepherd has a separate permit for each sheep grazing on the
commons, she is breaking the law. The government then allocates the
permits in some fashion (which, as noted above, will have significant
distributional consequences) and lets trading commence. Those for
whom grazing is most valuable will pay the highest price to buy the
permits from those who value it less, ensuring that the commons is
dedicated to the most valuable market use. If the cap is set
appropriately, marketable permits achieve the same level of
protection as command-and-control alternatives, but at a lower cost.
The tradable-permit approach has additional benefits in the
pollution realm. By letting the market rather than regulators
determine individual actors’ emissions, profit-motivated agents who
can control pollution at low cost can sell surplus allowances to highercost agents at a profit. This creates an incentive to over-comply—to
reduce emissions even more than is necessary to comply with permit
limits. Each polluter will weigh the marginal cost of abatement
against the cost of buying credits and then make an efficient
individual decision. If the market price for credits is high enough,
pollution reduction can become a profit center in its own right.

Salzman (Do Not Delete)

5/7/2013 11:17 AM

370

[Vol. XXIII:363

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

Initially allocating permits presents a challenge for trading, just
as it does for pure private-property approaches. Moreover,
constructing smoothly functioning markets is not simple. There must
be a well-defined marketplace and enough buyers and sellers to
support an active market. There also must be an effective currency of
trade, one that is fungible and that reflects the desired environmental
quality. For example, it would be a stretch to consider allowing
coastal developers in Florida to “trade” the wetland ecosystem
services they eliminate (such as flood control or nutrient filtering) for
phosphorous emissions reductions in Oregon.
Because the market decides where the allowances go after their
initial allocation, there is a further challenge that harmful activities
can be concentrated, creating local “hotspots” of pollution. This can
become an environmental justice concern, for example, when
allowances to emit hazardous air pollutants are concentrated in low16
income communities.
But where the environmental good (or bad, so to speak) can be
captured in a measurable unit (whether that be tons of pollutant or
kilos of fish), market service areas and participants are well-defined,
and hotspots are not significant, trading programs have had
demonstrable success in a variety of contexts, from fisheries to
wetlands, increasing the efficiency and flexibility of prescriptive
17
instruments.
3. FINANCIAL PENALTIES
Short of banning an activity, the next most effective way to limit
the behavior is to make it more expensive, whether through charges,
taxes, or liability. By increasing the costs of polluting activities, such
penalties discourage pollution and waste and force the polluter to
bear the costs of her activities. To use economics language, the
polluter internalizes the negative externalities of her behavior. Also
known as a Pigouvian tax, this policy instrument ensures that each
16. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental
Laws and “Justice”, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 230 (1997) (“[E]nvironmental justice concerns are
raised by the disproportionate burden of environmental hazards or undesirable land uses borne
by low-income and minority communities.”).
17. See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship
and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 395 (1999) (describing U.S.
fisheries’ “experiments with exclusive property rights, in which fisheries are managed as closed
systems through . . . perpetual harvesting rights known as individual transferable quotas
(‘ITQs’)”); see also James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 614 (2000).
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actor has a direct incentive to regulate her own behavior according to
18
how valuable the polluting activities are. In our commons example,
shepherds might be charged a fee per sheep for the right to graze
each day. The fee could be shifted up or down, depending on the
desired level of grazing. Carbon taxes, much discussed in the press at
the moment, are a topical example of this approach.
In theory, financial penalties offer an attractive policy
instrument. One could levy the penalty on pollution (whether kilos of
emissions or solid waste), on the feedstock (for example, a carbon tax
on oil or coal), or on the final product (for example, a gas-guzzling
car), but there are two practical obstacles. The first lies in getting the
price right. Markets are efficient when the prices for goods accurately
reflect their full environmental and social cost. A key aspect in
internalizing externalities, then, is valuation. If one agrees that
externalities should be internalized—that polluters should pay—the
obvious question is “how much”? For example, we might all agree
that CFC emissions harm the ozone layer, but how much monetary
harm is caused by releasing a kilogram of CFCs? One dollar? One
penny? One-hundredth of a penny? Because there is no market for
the ozone layer, these values can only be estimated. Or perhaps it
may be sufficient to focus, instead, on the level of penalty that
changes behavior.
The second challenge is political. As the battles in Congress over
the budget have made clear, increasing taxes is never easy, and
environmental charges seem to be harder still. President Clinton
proposed a carbon tax at the start of his presidency, but the proposal
19
quickly died in a hailstorm of political opposition. This is not to say
that environmental taxes are never passed. They have become
common in Europe and may be found in the United States; for
example, on CFCs. But levying them at charges high enough to

18. In economic terms, the penalty should be set so it equals the marginal environmental
damage at the socially optimal level of pollution. See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 172–203 (4th ed. 1932) (discussing “incidental uncharged disservices,” now called
negative externalities, in chapter on marginal social net product); see also William J. Baumol,
On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 308–09 (1972) (explaining
the reciprocal nature of social costs). For a discussion of Pigouvian Tax Theory and control of
externalities, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21–23 (2d ed. 1988).
19. See Clinton Gives Carbon Tax Thumbs Down, COAL & SYNFUELS TECH., Feb. 22,
1993, at 2 (citing public criticism of President Clinton’s carbon tax proposal); Thomas P. Lyon,
‘Green’ Firms Bearing Gifts, 26 REG. 36, 39 (noting that “political resistance was fast and
powerful” to carbon tax proposals).
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influence behavior significantly is easier said than done. In many
cases, the charges have been intended more for revenue-raising than
for serious behavior modification.
4. FINANCIAL PAYMENTS
As noted above, government can discourage certain polluting
activities through penalties or, equally, it can use subsidies to
encourage beneficial activities. Just as government can use penalties
to capture negative externalities and make bad activities more
expensive, it can use payments to capture positive externalities and
make good activities less expensive. In our commons, shepherds
might be paid $100 not to graze one of their sheep for a year. The
shepherd is effectively being paid for not exercising her right to graze.
In one example of this approach, California has embarked on a major
20
program of tax benefits for property owners who install solar panels.
Paying “cash for clunkers” to get high-polluting older cars off the
21
road is another example, as is paying agricultural subsidies to
farmers for setting aside cropland to prevent erosion or provide
22
wildlife habitat. This is the approach behind the popular strategy of
23
payments for ecosystem services.
Not all payment schemes benefit the environment, however.
Quite the opposite, since many government subsidies actually
encourage harmful activities. The Green Scissors Report, published
annually by an alliance of environmental and conservative groups,
identifies billions of dollars in subsidies whose elimination would both
help the environment and reduce the federal budget deficit (such as
24
subsidies for building logging roads on public lands). In certain
respects, perverse subsidies cost us twice—first, when we pay the
initial tax to raise the funds needed for the subsidy and second, when
we suffer the environmental damage encouraged by the subsidy.

20. See David R. Baker, State’s Systems Top 1 Gigawatt Level, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11, 2013,
at C1 (“California’s rebate program for businesses and homeowners who install solar panels has
now funded enough systems to generate 1 gigawatt of electricity . . . .”).
21. See e.g., ‘Cash for Clunkers’ Runs on Empty, STAR-NEWS, Aug. 1, 2009, at 1A (noting
failure of federal “cash for clunkers” program).
22. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831–3835a (2012) (codifying agricultural subsidies).
23. See, e.g., James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the
Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005); J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES (2007).
24. GREEN SCISSORS, http://www.greenscissors.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
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5. PERSUASION
If prescriptive regulation and market instruments represent “hard”
regulatory approaches, then a softer approach may be found in laws
requiring information production and dissemination. Sometimes
described as reflexive laws, the theory behind such approaches is that
the government can change people’s behavior by forcing them to think
25
about the harm they are causing and by publicizing that harm. In the
context of the commons, the government might require shepherds to
record and publish the number of sheep they graze, the amount of
forage the sheep eat, or the days before the commons can no longer
support grazing. The government also may try to educate the shepherds
with brochures or presentations on the causes and dangers of
overgrazing, or may sponsor a pilot project that demonstrates more
effective ways to manage the commons.
The best-known example in the United States would be the
environmental impact assessments required under the National
Environmental Policy Act. Requirements that agencies or developers
prepare an environmental assessment for activities with significant
impacts may be found all over the globe at local, national, and
26
international levels.
Information-based approaches are often used when there is
inadequate political support to impose market or regulatory
instruments, or when such instruments are ill-suited to the problem. In
a number of cases, particularly in the case of pollution, requirements to
collect and disseminate information have led to significant changes in
the behavior of regulated parties, even in the absence of overt
prescriptive regulation. The Toxic Release Inventory, for example,
simply requires manufacturers who emit a number of substances to
27
monitor, measure, and publicly report their annual emissions. Whether
because of “naming-and-shaming,” measuring emissions for the first
time, or heightened consciousness, this persuasive instrument has led to
significant reductions in emissions without the threat of fines or

25. See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV 1227
(1995).
26. See, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–
21189.3 (West 2013) (local level); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4370(h) (2012) (national level); Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 (international level).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2013); see also Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (featuring searchable
database of facilities disposing of toxic chemicals).

Salzman (Do Not Delete)

5/7/2013 11:17 AM

374

[Vol. XXIII:363

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

penalties. Persuasion instruments can also be used to “nudge” behavior
toward energy efficiency, for example, by providing smiley-face
encouragement on utility bills for better conservation than your
28
neighbors.
PUTTING THE TOOLKIT TO WORK
While the examples above have used the case of grazing on the
commons, one can apply this toolkit of regulatory instruments to
29
virtually any environmental problem. Taking climate change as an
example, consider the range of legal instruments you could use to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as their potential
shortcomings. If you were head of the EPA, what would your proposed
greenhouse gas reduction strategy look like?
Prescriptive regulation could take the form of emission controls,
limiting the amount of greenhouse gases a source may emit.
Regulations might mandate the use of certain pollution control
technologies or other process design requirements (often referred to as
30
best available technology or BAT).
Financial penalties seem like a good potential fit as well. You could
levy emission fees based on the amount of greenhouse gases emitted.
These would encourage each actor to look for ways to reduce her
emissions and to change her behavior according to how valuable the
31
polluting activities are. Conversely, you could rely on payments,
providing tax credits for research and development on energy efficient
technologies or tax deductions for energy-efficient purchases. You
could even remove subsidies for oil and coal exploration.
Relying on property rights, you could establish a trading market
for greenhouse gases. In the typical cap-and-trade-program for
28. Mark Joseph Stern, A Little Guilt, A Lot of Energy Savings: How Smiley Faces and
Peer Pressure Can Save Money—and the Planet, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/the_efficient_planet/2013/03/opower_using_smiley_fac
es_and_peer_pressure_to_save_the_planet.html; RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
29. Professor Melinda Benson, who used this model in class, has suggested a sixth P–
Protest. It is not a likely strategy for governmental actions, but is a nice extension to non-state
actors. Email from Melinda Harm Benson, Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico, to
Author (Aug. 7, 2012) (on file with author).
30. See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71)
(subjecting certain stationary sources to best available control technology standards).
31. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rosenthal, Carbon Taxes Make Ireland Even Greener, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2012, at A1 (highlighting ways that Irish citizens have changed their environmental
behavior as a result of taxes on fossil fuels).
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pollution, policymakers would establish a socially desirable level of
aggregate greenhouse gas emissions, determine a formula for initial
allocation of emissions among sources, and issue or auction permits to
members of the regulated community that entitle each bearer to emit a
given quantity of that pollutant. The political battle would focus on the
overall cap, how allocations are distributed, and which emitters are
32
included in the trading market.
Finally, persuasion through information disclosure might work
well. You could, for example, require firms to collect and publish data
on their greenhouse gas emissions on the web. Similarly, you might
create an eco-labeling program, providing a seal of approval for those
companies or goods that achieve significant greenhouse gas
33
reductions. The goal behind such programs is to provide green
consumers with reliable information on which to base their purchases
and favor environmentally friendlier companies in the marketplace.
You could also promote websites that allow people to calculate their
34
carbon footprint.
The Five P’s could also apply to conserving an endangered species,
perhaps a rare bird. Prescriptive regulation might ban actions that kill
35
or harm the birds, or degrade their habitat. Property rights could be
used to create a trading program where breeding pairs became the
currency of exchange—landowners who modified their habitat so it was
less attractive to the birds could mitigate their actions by purchasing
credit for breeding pairs that had been established by entrepreneurs in
other areas. This “species banking” could create an incentive for
entrepreneurs to convert farmland, for example, into endangered
36
species habitat. Financial penalties could be imposed on landowners
who make habitat less attractive to local endangered species.
Conversely, payments could be made to landowners who improve
32. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009) (as passed by House of Representatives, June 26, 2009) (proposing emissions trading
program); see also John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, at A1 (outlining politically disputed portions of Waxman-Markey
legislation).
33. See, e.g., ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2013)
(providing global ecolabel information to “increas[e] transparency and help[] buyers and sellers
use them more effectively”).
34. See,
e.g.,
What’s
My
Carbon
Footprint?,
NATURE
CONSERVANCY,
http://www.nature.org/greenliving/carboncalculator/index.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2013)
(allowing users to calculate their carbon footprints).
35. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012) (making it unlawful to “take” any endangered species).
36. See About Us, SPECIESBANKING.COM, http://global.speciesbanking.com/pages/
about_us (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (explaining concept of species banking).
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habitat to make it more attractive to breeding pairs. And persuasion
could be used by highlighting the natural heritage of local biodiversity.
To be sure, this framework cannot perfectly capture the dizzying
range of all environmental policy. The vast majority of instruments,
however, do fit easily within the Five P’s framework. As a result, a
teacher can easily share the broad range of policy options with
students. They, in turn, can then assess which instrument or
combination of instruments best fits the particular situation. Using the
Five P’s approach in the classroom can make the taxonomy, relative
strengths, and comparative weaknesses of instrument choices clear to
students.
Based on the experience of the DELPF editors and my former
students over the years, the details of Section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act or the liability requirements under Superfund fade away
soon after the course ends. The Five P’s, though, have stayed with them.
If their experience is any guide, the Five P’s framework can strengthen
students’ understanding of environmental law and policy in a simple
manner they are likely to remember long after their final exam.

